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Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination:  





Violence against women is one of the greatest threats to women‟s equality and 
equal enjoyment of human rights. Yet, there is no single treaty provision 
explicitly prohibiting violence against women within any of the eight „core‟ 
international human rights treaties, nor a binding international treaty 
specifically on the issue. In the work of the UN human rights treaty bodies, 
one of their approaches to recognising violence against women has been to 
subsume it within the guarantees to equality and non-discrimination on the 
basis of sex. This article examines the meanings given to these concepts and 
inquires into whether this approach to what is an obvious gender gap in the 
international human rights framework is effective. 
 
 





On the concluding day of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 
1995, the Secretary-General of the United Nations declared that: ‗The movement for 
gender equality the world over has been one of the defining developments of our 
time.‘2 He added that, despite progress made, ‗much, much more remains to be 
done.‘3 On this path to equality, violence against women has featured as a clear 
obstacle to women‘s enjoyment of other human rights, in particular their rights to be 
treated in equality and with dignity.  
 
Violence suffered by women is a global crisis that is a shared experience of women 
and girls4 across historical periods, countries and cultures. 5 During their lives, women 
and girls may be subjected to a range of life-threatening violence, including ‗honour‘ 
killings, acid violence, bride burning, domestic violence, or maternal death.6 The 
conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s brought renewed focus to 
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genocide as a heinous crime committed during armed conflict, with belated 
acknowledgement that women were exposed to particular forms of genocide, 
including through the use of rape and sexual violence. 7 Such forms of violence 
against women have continued into other conflicts. 8 Female genital mutilation 
remains a problem in many societies and has been declared a human rights violation 
by the World Health Organization.9 According to the United Nations Population 
Fund, up to sixty million girls and women are missing from Asian populations due to 
sex-selective abortions and infanticide.10 Amartya Sen has suggested that the figure is 
closer to over 100 million, caused in part by low literacy, education, and lack of 
economic opportunities for women.11 Around 800,000 persons, mainly women and 
children, are estimated to be trafficked each year, largely for sexual exploitation and 
slavery.12 According to the UN, violence is perpetrated against women and girls in all 
societies, in both conflict and in peacetime, and it ‗cuts across lines of income, class 
and culture.‘13  
 
Despite extensive evidence and statements regarding the scale and ser ious effects of 
violence, the UN and its system of international law have been slow to recognise the 
issue officially as of concern. In particular, there is no single treaty provision 
explicitly prohibiting violence against women within any of the eight ‗core‘ human 
rights treaties,14 nor a binding international treaty specifically on the issue. 15 Because 
of this omission, the UN human rights treaty bodies or committees with responsibility 
for overseeing the implementation of treaty obligations by states part ies, have sought 
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to incorporate violence against women as an issue of concern by applying gendered 
interpretations to existing provisions.16 One way they have sought to achieve this is 
by characterising violence against women as a form of sex discrimination. For the 
purposes of this article, violence against women is understood to encompass, but is 
not limited to, any act or threat of physical, sexual, or psychological violence 
perpetrated against women.17  
 
In this article, I explore how the concepts of equality and non-discrimination on the 
basis of sex have been interpreted and applied to various forms of violence against 
women by the UN human rights treaty bodies. How are sex discrimination and 
inequality understood under international law? What has this meant for the inclusion 
of women and their lives within these prohibitions? What progress has been made, if 
any, since the adoption of the UN Charter? In particular, I consider whether treating 
violence against women as sex discrimination has been effective in filling this 
obvious gender gap in international law. But, first, I provide a brief overview of the 
treaty bodies. 
 
B. THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES 
 
International supervision of the implementation by states parties of most of their 
international human rights treaty obligations is carried out by independent 
committees, called treaty bodies. As at June 2008, the UN human rights treaty body 
system includes eight international treaty bodies that oversee the implementation of 
eight human rights treaties.18 Of these, I am interested in the work of the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC), which monitors the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR);19 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CERD) (the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1966 (ICERD));20 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
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(CERD) (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1965 (ICERD));21 and the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (the Women‘s Committee) (the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979 (CEDAW)).22 They 
are established pursuant to the treaty they monitor or by other UN resolution.23 The 
committees are composed of independent experts of ‗high moral character and 
recognized competence in the field of human rights‘,24 who sit on a part-time basis.25   
 
The functions of these treaty bodies are four- fold. First, the treaty bodies receive and 
examine reports submitted by states parties on a periodic basis.26 Second, the treaty 
bodies have developed the practice of issuing authoritative statements or guidance to 
states parties on the meaning of substantive rights, the obligations of states parties, 
and other common issues (known as either General Comments or General 
Recommendations).27 Third, two of these treaty bodies have jurisdiction to receive 
and consider inter-state communications relating to a dispute between two states 
parties,28 although no such communications have ever been lodged. Fourth, the 
majority of the committees receive and consider petitions by individuals alleging 
violation of one or more of their human rights by a state party (known as ‗individual 
communications‘).29 In addition, the CERD and the Women‘s Committee have 
additional mechanisms to conduct fact- finding inquiries.30 The views expressed by the 
treaty bodies in the carrying out of these functions make up what is loosely known as 
the ‗jurisprudence‘ of the treaty bodies, which is the focus of this article. 
 
C. FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW AND THE EQUALITY GUARANTEES 
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Animating feminist theories of the international legal system is the exclusion of 
women from mainstream human rights norms, processes, and institutions. In this 
article, I adopt Janet Halley‘s three-tiered definition of feminism. First, to qualify as a 
feminist argument, a distinction must be made between men/male/masculine (which 
she refers to as ‗m‘) and women/female/feminine (which she refers to as ‗f‘). Second, 
feminism must posit some kind of subordination between m and f, in which f is the 
disadvantaged or subordinated element. Third, in opposing this subordination and in 
attempting to eradicate it, ‗feminism carries a brief for f.‘31 I also agree with Nancy 
Levit and Robert Verchick‘s identification of two shared features of all feminist 
theories – the first is an observation - the world has been shaped by men, particularly 
white men, who for this reason possess larger shares of power and privilege; the 
second is an aspiration - all feminists believe that women and men should have 
political, social, and economic equality. But while feminists agree on the goal of 
equality, they disagree about its meaning and on how to achieve it. 32 
 
Broadly speaking, feminist scholars argue that international human rights law is 
conceived as a set of ‗male‘ rights.33  By ‗male‘ rights, feminists mean that rights are 
‗defined by the criterion of what men fear will happen to them‘; 34 that the content o f 
the rules of international law privilege men and fail to acknowledge, or otherwise 
marginalise or silence, women‘s interests ;35 and the very choice and categorisation of 
subject matter deemed appropriate for international regulation reflects male 
priorities.36 In this way, the system of international law is said to be a ‗thoroughly 
gendered system.‘37 The omission of an explicit prohibition on violence against 
women is an example in point. Moreover, feminist theory criticises international 
human rights law for adopting the ‗male‘ sex as the standard against which all 
individuals are judged. Women become the deviation from this standard. 38 In short, 
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women are an exception to the rule. Meanwhile, governments accept and promote this 
perspective as the rule of law.39  
 
A sub-set of the above critique is the distinction drawn between the public and private 
spheres of everyday life for the purposes of international legal rules. As international 
law privileges the public sphere of life over the private, and thereby refuses to 
recognise the ‗specificity of the female life in the private sphere,‘40 it ignores, 
marginalises, or silences women‘s concerns. This so-called public/private dichotomy 
is said to be the source of women‘s exclusion from international law, in particular 
because it is manifest in the theory of state responsibility for human rights abuses. 41 
The boundaries between the ‗public‘ and the ‗private‘ and the allocation of men and 
women thereto, are ‗deeply political and inherently constructed.‘42 
 
On a practical level, the effect of distinguishing between the public and the private 
has ‗rendered invisible‘ or at least, less important, the many violations that women 
suffer in private.43 Excluding violence against women from the human rights agenda 
arises from a failure to see the oppression of women as political.44 In this way, it 
leaves the private or family realm, where the majority of women spend the bulk of 
their lives, unregulated, unprotected, and susceptible to abuse. 45 Many violent acts 
committed against women at the hands of men occur prior to or without direct state 
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involvement.46 At the domestic level, for example, women have trouble convincing 
law enforcement officials that violent acts within the home are criminal. 47 At the 
international level this is translated into difficulties women face in convincing the 
international community that domestic violence is of international, in addition to 
national, concern. 
 
While there is general agreement among feminist scholars that the international 
human rights legal system could do more to address the particular concerns of 
women, there is far less agreement as to the reasons for women‘s exclusion, how the 
system may be reformed to be more inclusive, or whether it is capable of being 
transformed. 
 
Equality and non-discrimination provisions, although considered central tenets of 
human rights law, have been especially criticised by feminist scholars. Originally 
believed to be the great hope for the international human rights system in its treatment 
and responses to women, rights to equality and non-discrimination on the basis of sex 
have come under considerable scrutiny. In particular, the initial model employed by 
international institutions assumed a female to male progression or, as Byrnes puts it, 
‗if men are entitled to something, then women should be entitled to the same thing; 
whereas true equality may involve the reworking of the core concept of the right to 
ensure that women enjoy that right fully.‘48  
 
Noreen Burrows contends that human rights norms seek to place women in the same 
situation as men,49 and this therefore fails to account for any differences. Increasingly, 
feminist theorists have taken issue with this approach to equality as assimilation, 
arguing that it fails to take account of situations in which men and women are not or 
cannot be similarly situated and it does not allow space for ‗deep-seated reform 
required to realise substantive gender equality‘ but instead accepts the existing system 
as legitimate.50 ‗[T]he prohibition of discrimination is not a prohibition of 
differentiation … [D]istinctions are prohibited only to the extent that they are 
unfavourable. Equality could easily be transformed into injustice if it were to be 
applied to situations which are inherently unequal.‘51 It has also been asserted that the 
orientation of the CEDAW around non-discrimination will not compel ‗a broader, 
nonrights-based examination of female subordination‘ because Article 1 defines 
discrimination in terms of unequal rights.52 For some scholars, the paradigm of 
‗equality as parity‘ employed in the CEDAW [and other international instruments] 
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fails to recognise that ‗equality is not freedom to be treated without regard to sex but 
freedom from systematic subordination because of sex.‘53  
 
Although there have been some shifts away from traditional construct ions of equality, 
as the latter part of this article demonstrates, the traditional equality paradigm remains 
the dominant framework, even after Beijing.54 The international legal system has had 
difficulty dealing with multiple forms of discrimination, and the tendency to elide the 
concepts of equality and non-discrimination is said to limit their ‗transformative 
possibilities,‘ in particular by limiting equality to a guarantee of equal opportunity.55 
International law has also developed a hierarchy of forms o f discrimination in which 
race discrimination is considered more serious than other forms of discrimination. 56 
 
With these critiques in mind, this article now turns to examine the meaning of these 
terms generally, followed by their application to violence against women specifically.  
 
D. EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION: GENERAL 
CONCEPTS  
 
‗[E]quality before the law is in a substantial sense the most fundamental of the rights 
of man[sic]. It occupies the first place in most written constitutions. It is the starting 
point of all other liberties.‘57 ‗[I]t is philosophically related to the concepts of freedom 
and justice.‘58 The principle of equality has been recognised as one of the 
fundamental principles of liberal democracies and government by the rule of law, a nd 
has been absorbed into many legal systems,59 including under international law. But 
some have considered ‗equality‘ as so vague and so wide a term that it is almost 
meaningless.60 So what do these terms mean generally, and how have they been 
interpreted under international law? 
 
In spite of the centrality of principles of equality and non-discrimination in law, they 
are deeply contested concepts. As ideals of justice they are well accepted principles,61 
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Amer. J. Int‟l L. 613, 630; M. Etienne, ‗Addressing Gender-Based Violence in an International 
Context‘ (1995) 18 Harv. Women‟s L. J. 139, 148. 
54
 R.J. Cook, ‗Advancing International Law Regarding Women‘ (1997) 91 Amer. Soc‟y Int‟l L. Proc. 
308, 316. 
55
 H. Charlesworth, ‗Concepts of Equality in International Law‘, in G. Huscroft & R. Rishworth (eds.), 
Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 
137, 143-147. See, further, N. Lacey, ‗Legislat ion Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a 
Femin ist Perspective‘ (1987) 14 J. L. & Soc‟y 411. 
56
 H. Charlesworth, ‗Concepts of Equality in International Law‘, in G. Huscroft & R. Rishworth (eds.), 
Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 
137, 143-147. 
57
 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, An International Bill of the Rights of Man (1945), 115. 
58
 South West Africa Cases (xxxx) 1962 ICJ Rep. 319; 1966 ICJ Rep. 4, 303 (per Tanaka J.).  
59
 Daniel Moeckli reports that 111 states guarantee some form of equality in written constitutions: D. 
Moeckli, Human Rights and Non-Discrimination in the ‗War on Terror‘ (Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
60
 J.F. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Cambridge University Press, 1873), 201, as referred to in 
W. McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983) 2. 
61
 This was not always the case, and remains a challenge in some countries. Early formulations of 
equality and non-discrimination were directed at equality between men of different relig ious, 
nationality, or linguistic minorit ies, or even limited to different classes: see, D. Moeckli, Human Rights 
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but their content is less obvious. At one end of the spectrum of views on equality is 
the liberal democratic tradition of equality as the comparison of similar situations.62 
This is also referred to as the Aristotelian view of equality as ‗treating like alike,‘ 63 or 
that persons in similar positions should not be treated unequally.64 The problem with 
this view is that it does not address what differences are relevant to determining 
whether individuals are equals or unequals.65 In terms of equality between men and 
women it is problematic on two levels. First, it assumes that the point of comparison 
is male; and second, it cannot be applied where a comparable male is missing. 66 This 
view of equality has largely been translated into national modern laws of equality of 
opportunity (or formal equality). That is, any distinction, exclusion, or restriction 
must not be arbitrary, but should be justified on the basis of objective and reasonable 
criteria. It generally requires equality de jure, rather than de facto. Formal equality in 
the form of equality before the law and equal rights are at the centre of liberal 
feminist goals in relation to women‘s equal participation in employment, the 
economy, and education.67 
 
The alternative approach to equality of access is in terms of outcome (or substantive 
equality). This formulation may envisage social justice as the end objective, albeit 
with a particular standard of social justice in mind. It permits deviations from strict 
equality, such as ‗special measures‘ or differences in treatment, designed to elevate 
persons to that standard.68 Substantive equality can be achieved for example through 
positive or affirmative action, protective or corrective measures, re-characterisation of 
human rights, or a gender-sensitive discrimination principle.69 Due to its limited 
consideration of women‘s structural disadvantage, especially in the private sphere, 
formal equality is rejected. Instead, substantive equality is promoted as it offers more 
hope to bring about ‗effective and genuine equality.‘70  
 
The concept of equality further arouses debate around issues of what distinctions can 
be justified as compatible with equality principles and upon what criteria should those 
distinctions be judged; determining whether or not intention is a requirement for 
                                                                                                                                           
and Non-Discrimination in the ‗War on Terror‘ (Oxford  University Press, 2008) for an excellent 
summary of the origins of the principles of equality and non-discrimination generally. 
62
 B. Gaze, ‗Some Aspects of Equality Rights: Theory and Practice‘, in B. Galligan & C. Sampford 
(eds.), Rethinking Human Rights (Federation Press, 1997) 189, 190. 
63
 C.A. MacKinnon, ‗Equality Remade: Violence Against Women‘, in C.A MacKinnon, are women 
human? And Other International Dialogues (Harvard University Press, 2006) 105. 
64
 W. McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983) 
3. 
65
 W. McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983) 
3. 
66
 K. Frostell, ‗Gender Difference and the Non-Discrimination Principle in the CCPR and the 
CEDAW‘, in L. Hannikainen and E Nykänen (ed.), New Trends in Discrimination Law – International 
Perspectives (Turku, Turku Law School, 1999) 29, 29.  
67
 N. Lacey, ‗Legislation Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a Femin ist Perspective‘ (1987) 
14 J. L. & Soc‟y 411, 413. See, further, Ch. 1. 
68
 W. McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983) 
3. 
69
 K. Frostell, ‗Gender Difference and the Non-Discrimination Principle in the CCPR and the 
CEDAW‘, in L. Hannikainen and E. Nykänen (ed.), New Trends in Discrimination Law – International 
Perspectives (Turku, Turku Law School, 1999) 29, 30. 
70
 Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 PCIL ser. A/B, no. 64, 19.  
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discrimination; deciding on the relevance of purpose and effect;71 and articulating 
whether there is any real difference between discrimination and inequality. So how 
are these principles translated into international law?  
 
E. EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF 
SEX IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
1. UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The notions of equality and non-discrimination are foundational principles of the UN 
system of international law. The UN Charter 1945 endorsed equality between men 
and women as a fundamental human right.72 Of the UN Charter, the UN has stated 
that ‗no previous legal document had so forcefully affirmed the equality of all human 
beings, or specifically outlawed sex as a basis for discrimination.‘73 These principles 
were elaborated upon in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 194874 (UDHR). 
Article 1 of the UDHR provides that: ‗All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.‘
75
 It is claimed by some scholars that 
the ‗spirit of brotherhood‘ was extended to women only with the adoption of the 
CEDAW.76 Article 2 of the UDHR provides that: ‗Everyone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.‘ Article 7 of the UDHR further guarantees 
equality before the law, stating:  
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to 
such discrimination. 
 
The UDHR also calls for equal rights in respect of courts and tribunals,77 within 
marriage,78 to public service and political participation,79 and in the workplace.80 All 
other rights apply to ‗everyone,‘ with the exception of measures of special protection 
                                                 
71
 K.E. Mahoney, ‗Canadian Approaches to Equality Rights and Gender Equity in the Courts‘, in R.J. 
Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 437, 442.  
72
 Arts. 1(3), 8 and 55(c), UN Charter, signed 26 June 1945. See, also, Preambular para. 2, UN Charter: 
‗reaffirm … faith in fundamental human rights, in the d ignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women.‘  
73
 United Nations, The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996 (Dept of Public 
Information, New York, 1995 and 1996), para . 33. 
74
 GA res. 217 A (III), 10 Dec. 1948. 
75
 Art. 1, UDHR. Clearly the language of ‗brotherhood‘ is gender specific in its reference to men.  
76
 R.L. Hillock, ‗Establishing the Rights of Women Globally : Has the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women made a Difference?‘ (2004 -2005) 12 
Tulsa J. Comp. & Int‟l L. 481, 482. 
77
 Art. 10, UDHR. 
78
 Art. 16, UDHR. 
79
 Art. 21, UDHR. This provision is though limited to citizens in its references to political participation 
in the government of ‗h is country.‘ 
80
 Art. 23, UDHR. 
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during motherhood and childhood.81 ‗Everyone‘ in this sense means men as well as 
women.82 
 
The inclusion of equality guarantees in the UN Charter and the UDHR resulted from 
heavy lobbying from women delegates and non-governmental organizations.83 
Although sex was always listed alongside other identity-based attributes in early UN 
documentation, such as race, religion and political opinion, it has been argued that the 
concept of equality that was initially conceived in international law related to the 
principle of equality of states,84 rather than equality between persons. Early equality 
rights also focused heavily on racial discrimination, rather than sex discrimination. 85  
  
2. International Human Rights Instruments  
 
These general principles in the UDHR were transferred, with little change, in binding 
form to the two general human rights Covenants: the ICCPR86 and the ICESCR.87 
Each treaty contains an over-arching accessory prohibition on non-discrimination, in 
which the provisions of the treaty are to be applied to all individuals within the 
territory and subject to the jurisdiction of the state party ‗without distinction of any 
kind‘, including on the basis of sex.88 Each document includes an additional provision 
that spells out that states parties to each Covenant ‗undertake to ensure the equa l right 
of men and women to the enjoyment of all [the] rights‘ contained therein.89 
Regardless of overlap, the Third Committee at the time of drafting the ICESCR 
indicated that the purpose of Article 3 in addition to Article 2(3) was for emphasis, 
stating that this fundamental principle ‗must be constantly emphasized.‘90 This same 
                                                 
81
 Art. 25, UDHR. 
82
 At one stage during the drafting process of the UDHR, specific reference to equality between men 
and women had been removed and was reinserted due to arguments by some delegates that t he 
additional non-discrimination phraseology was essential because ‗everyone‘ did not necessarily mean 
every individual, regardless of sex, in some countries. Similarly, an early version of Article 1 that 
started with ‗all men‘ was corrected, albeit amid considerable resistance. Even Eleanor Roosevelt 
stated that it had become customary to refer to ‗mankind‘ when also referring to women, or that 
translation problems made it unadvisable to use ‗human beings‘ instead of ‗men‘: UN Doc. 
AC.2/SR.2/p.4). In fact, the Human Rights Commission had voted upon and accepted the phrase ‗all 
people, men and women …‘, but it is not clear how the final version reverted to ‗all human beings.‘ 
See, J. Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Dra fting, and Intent (University 
of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelph ia, 1999), 118.  
83
 United Nations, The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996 (Dept of Public 
Information, New York, 1995 and 1996), para. 32; J. Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: Origins, Dra fting, and Intent (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1999), 117-118. 
84
 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 5
th
 ed., 1998), 289-90, 
as referred to in H. Charlesworth, ‗Concepts of Equality in International Law‘, in G. Huscroft & R. 
Rishworth (eds.), Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 137, 137.  
85
 See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crmie of Geno cide 1948, GA res. 
260 (III), 9 Dec. 1948 (entered into force 12 Jan. 1951); ICERD; and the International Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of Apartheid 1973, GA res. 3068 (XXVIII), 30 Nov. 1973 (entered 
into force 18 July 1976). 
86
 Art. 2, 3, 14(1) and 26, ICCPR. 
87
 Arts. 2 & 3, ICESCR. 
88
 Art. 2(1), ICCPR; Art. 2(1), ICESCR. 
89
 Art. 3, ICCPR; Art. 3, ICESCR. 
90
 The Third Committee stated that ‗the same rights should be expressly recognized for men and 
women on an equal footing and suitable measures should be taken to ensure that women ha[ve] the 
opportunity to exercise their rights …  Moreover, even if article 3 overlapped with article 2, paragraph 
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argument can be extended to the drafting model in the ICCPR, and it has been 
accepted by a number of commentators who emphasise the positive nature of Article 
3. 91   
 
These non-discrimination guarantees are non-derogable and cannot be removed or 
weakened by states even during states of emergency. 92 Similar accessory non-
discrimination provisions are found in most of the major human rights instruments, 
including the CRC,93 MWC,94 and the ICPD.95 However, there are no provisions 
outlawing sex discrimination or inequality between men and women in either the 
UNCAT or the ICERD.96 
 
In addition, the ICCPR and the ICESCR each includes a number of stand-alone or 
autonomous rights to equality in specific fields, such as Article 26 of the ICCPR, 
which guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the law. 97 Although 
there is no equivalent in the ICESCR, Article 26 of the ICCPR has been interpreted 
broadly so as to protect against unequal treatment in any area of law, including 
economic, social and cultural rights (see below). In addition, the ICCPR guarantees 
                                                                                                                                           
2, it was still necessary to reaffirm the equality rights between men and women. That fundamental 
principle, which was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, must be constantly emphasized, 
especially as there were still many prejudices preventing its full application.‘ Draft International 
Covenants on Human Rights Report of the Third Committee, UN Doc. A/53/65 (17 December 1962), 
para. 85, as re-stated in ICESCR, General Comment No. 16 (2004), Article 3: The Equal Right of Men 
and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/3, 
para. 2. 
91
 M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl, Engel, 1993), 
67, who argues that Article 3 was inserted merely for emphasis, although with a ‗positive goal in 
mind.‘ See, also, Lord Lester of Herne QC and S. Joseph, ‗Obligations of Non -Discrimination‘, in D. 
Harris & S. Joseph (ed.), The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and United 
Kingdom Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), 565, who states that Article 2 relates to non -
discrimination (a negative obligation), whereas Article 3 guarantees equality (a positive obligation).  
92
 Art. 4, ICCPR; Art. 2, ICESCR. 
93
 Art. 2(1), CRC: ‗States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention 
to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or 
his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, relig ion, political or other opinion, 
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, b irth or other status.‘ Art. 2(2), CRC imposes 
positive obligations to protect against discrimination in particular circumstances: ‗States Parties shall 
take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or 
punishment on the basis of the status, activities , expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, 
legal guardians, or family members.‘  
94
 Art. 7, MWC: ‗States Parties undertake, in accordance with the international instruments concerning 
human rights, to respect and to ensure to all migrant workers and members of their families within their 
territory or subject to their ju risdiction the rights provided for in the present Convention without 
distinction of any kind such as to sex, race, colour, language, religion or conviction, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, economic position, property, marital status, 
birth or other status.‘ 
95
 Arts. 3(b) and 5, International Convention on the Human Rights of Persons with Disabilit ies 2006.  
96
 Clearly the CERD is a non-discrimination instrument, but it is specifically focused on racial 
discrimination. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has though recognised the 
inter-sectionality of race and sex: CERD, General Recommendation No. XXV (2000), Gender-related 
dimensions of racial discrimination, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7.  
97
 Art. 26 provides: ‗All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee 
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, 
sex, language, relig ion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.‘ 
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equal rights to marriage, during marriage, and at its dissolution (Article 23); equality 
before courts and tribunals (Article 14(1)); and the right to vote for citizens and to be 
elected based on universal and equal suffrage, and equal access to public service 
(Article 25). Under the ICCPR, children are entitled to measures of protection in line 
with their status as a minor on the basis of non-discrimination, including sex (Article 
24). The ICESCR guarantees equality in the context of fair wages, equal remuneration 
for work of equal value, and access to promotion, without discrimination (Article 7). 
It further provides for primary education to be provided to all, for secondary 
education to be generally available, and higher education to be equally accessible 
based on capacity (Article 13).  
 
The first UN treaty devoted entirely to equality and non-discrimination was the 
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 1965. The 
ICERD builds on the Charter references to dignity and equality and translates them 
into the context of race discrimination,98 which is defined as:  
 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural or any other field of public life.99 
 
The second treaty in which rights to equality and non-discrimination have been 
developed is in the specific context of sex. In 1979, the UN General Assembly 
adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW). In many respects, its provisions parallel those of the ICERD. In 
particular, the definition in the CEDAW is very similar to that in the ICERD: 
 
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of equality 
of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.100 
 
Among the main discussions held during the drafting process to the CEDAW before 
the Commission on the Status of Women was whether the treaty ought to be limited in 
its scope to sex discrimination against women specifically, or on grounds of 
gender/sex more generally.101 The final version was a synthesis of these two views, 
with both discrimination ‗against women‘ and ‗distinction, exclusion or restriction on 
                                                 
98
 H. Charlesworth, ‗Concepts of Equality in International Law‘, in G. Huscroft & R. Rishworth (eds.), 
Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 
137, 138. 
99
 Art. 1(1), ICERD. 
100
 Art. 1, CEDAW. 
101
 See, L.A. Rehof, Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires of the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 
1993), 44. See, also, W. McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1983) on background to the drafting of the CEDAW and other instruments on equality 
between women and men. 
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the basis of sex‘ included,102 although the treaty clearly only covers sex 
discrimination as it applies to women. 
 
Coupled with Article 2 of the CEDAW which condemns discrimination against 
women in all its forms and calls on governments to take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate such discrimination ‗by any person, organization or enterprise‘, the 
CEDAW prohibits discrimination in the public and in the private. Further, Articles 
2(f) and 5(a) impose obligations upon States to address cultural and traditional 
practices that constitute discrimination against women, and in effect, seek to redress 
structural causes of inequality.  
 
The CEDAW also permits the introduction of temporary special measures (or time-
limited measures of affirmative action), providing: 
 
1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at 
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be 
considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no 
way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; 
these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of 
opportunity and treatment have been achieved.  
2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures 
contained in the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not 
be considered discriminatory.103 
 
The third discrimination-based treaty at the UN level is the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities 2006 (ICPRD). It borrows the definition employed in the 
two earlier treaties, with an important addition in relation to ‗reasonable 
accommodation‘:  
 
any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the 
purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It 
includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of reasonable 
accommodation; 
‗Reasonable accommodation‘ means necessary and appropriate mod ification 
and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where 
needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the 
enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.104 
 
                                                 
102
 L.A. Rehof, Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires of the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 
1993), 44. 
103
 Art. 4, CEDAW. 
104
 Art. 2, CRPD. See, also, Art. 5, which provides further explanations for what constitutes equality 
and non-discrimination. 
 15 
Unlike the ICERD, the ICRPD contains two further provisions that acknowledge the 
multiple forms of discrimination suffered by women with disabilities. 105 The ICPRD 
recognises that ‗women and girls with disabilities are subject to multiple 
discrimination and in this regard [states parties] shall take measures to ensure the full 
and equal enjoyment by them of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.‘ 106 It 
further calls upon states parties ‗[t]o combat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful 
practices relating to persons with disabilities, including those based on sex and age, in 
all areas of life.‘107 
 
Some other forms of discrimination have been dealt with in non-binding international 
instruments.108 The principles of equality and non-discrimination are now well 
established in international legal instruments. How have they been interpreted and 
applied? 
 
3. International Jurisprudence  
 
(a) Equality in law and in fact 
 
Cases raising equality and non-discrimination date to the inter-war period. The 
Permanent Court of Justice (PCJ) considered a number of cases dealing with the 
treatment of minorities in Europe. In Minority Schools in Albania, the Court noted: 
 
Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind; whereas equality in fact 
may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to attain a result 
which establishes equilibrium between different situations. 109 
 
The PCJ‘s successor, the International Court of Justice, has also dealt with non-
discrimination in a number of cases.110 Of particular note is the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Tanaka in the South West African Cases.111 In rejecting South Africa‘s claim 
that differential treatment on the basis of race (apartheid) was consistent with 
international law, he held that ‗[t]he fundamental point in the equality principle  is that 
all persons have an equal value in themselves.‘112 In endorsing the Aristotelian view 
that treating different matters equally would be as unjust as treating equal matters 
differently, he nonetheless offered some parameters on how to determine acceptable 
differentiation. He referred specifically to justice and reasonableness. He also rejected 
the idea that motive or purpose was relevant to determining whether a distinction is 
arbitrary or unlawful.113 Distinguishing minors, disabled persons, and men and 
women from the unequal treatment of persons of different races, he concluded that 
                                                 
105
 See, Arts. 3(a) and 6.  
106
 Art. 6(a), ICRPD. 
107
 Art. 8(b), ICRPD. 
108
 See, e.g., UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief 1981, GA res. 36/55, reprinted in (1982) 21 I.L.M. 205.  
109
 Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 PCIL ser. A/B, no. 64. 
110
 See, e.g., Rights of Nationals of the USA in Morocco (France v. USA), ICJ 1952 (In  this case, 
France was exempted from import controls in Morocco whereas the US was subjected to them. The ICJ 
held unanimously that this was discrimination in favour of France and that the US could claim for its 
unfavourable treatment);  
111
 1962 ICJ Rep. 319; 1966 ICJ Rep. 4.  
112
 South West Africa Cases (xxxx) 1962 ICJ Rep. 319; 1966 ICJ Rep. 4, 288 and 303 (per Tanaka J.).  
113
 South West Africa Cases (xxxx) 1962 ICJ Rep. 319; 1966 ICJ Rep. 4, 304 (per Tanaka J.).  
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racial physical characteristics are not relevant factors that could justify differential 
treatment.114  
 
In 1981, the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment on Article 3 stated 
that it covers both equality in law and in fact. 115 In 1989, the HRC adopted a 
subsequent General Comment on equality and non-discrimination in relation to 
Article 26. The General Comment provides that ‗[n]on-discrimination, together with 
equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, 
constitute[-] a basic and general principle relating to the protection of human 
rights.‘116 Referring to the definitions of discrimination contained in the ICERD and 
the CEDAW, the HRC has stated that:  
 
the Committee believes the term ‗discrimination‘ as used in the Covenant 
should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all 
rights and freedoms.117  
 
This definition of discrimination is ‗relatively broad‘ in two main respects: it does not 
require proof of discriminatory intent and it encompasses both direct and indirect 
discrimination.118 In addition the HRC notes that treatment on an ‗equal footing‘ does 
not mean identical treatment in every instance, but it recalls that any exceptions are 
explicitly referred to in the Covenant itself. 119 In spite of its suggestion that any 
exceptions to identical treatment are self-contained in the Covenant, the Committee 
has added that ‗not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if 
the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to 
achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant.‘120 The HRC further 
accepts that affirmative action may be required to satisfy equality guarantees and that 
the former does not contravene the latter.121 
 
Like the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have each 
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 South West Africa Cases (xxxx) 1962 ICJ Rep. 319; 1966 ICJ Rep. 4, 306 (per Tanaka J.).  
115
 HRC, General Comment No. 4 (1981), Art icle 3, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, para. 2.  
116
 HRC, General Comment No. 18 (1989), Non-Discrimination, UN Doc. HRC/GEN/1/Rev.5, para. 1. 
See, also, CERD, General Recommendation XIV (1993), Defin ition of discrimination (Art. 1(1)), UN 
Doc. A/48/18, para. 1.  
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 HRC, General Comment No. 18 (1989), Non-Discrimination, UN Doc. HRC/GEN/1/Rev.5, para. 7.  
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 H. Charlesworth, ‗Concepts of Equality in International Law‘, in G. Huscroft & R. Rishworth (eds.), 
Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 
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 HRC, General Comment No. 18 (1989), Non-Discrimination, UN Doc. HRC/GEN/1/Rev.5, para. 
13. 
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 HRC, General Comment No. 18 (1989), Non-Discrimination, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, para. 10. 
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accepted that equality includes both formal and substantive equality. 122 According to 
the CESCR, formal equality assumes that equality is achieved if a law or policy treats 
men and women in a ‗neutral manner‘ (that is, regardless of their sex), whereas 
substantive equality requires the effect of those laws, policies, and practices to 
alleviate any ‗inherent disadvantage‘ of either sex. 123 In regards to the latter, the 
Committee has acknowledged that temporary special measures may be needed to 
bring disadvantaged groups ‗to the same substantive level as others.‘ 124 Deferring to 
the definition of discrimination in the ICERD and the CEDAW, the CESCR has 
stated that direct discrimination occurs when differential treatment is based 
exclusively on sex and characteristics of women that cannot be objectively 
justified.125 Indirect discrimination, in contrast, occurs when a law, policy, or practice 
does not appear on its face to be discriminatory, but is discriminatory in its effect.126 
Discriminatory purpose or intent is considered irrelevant by both committees.  
 
Generally, the HRC has held that laws that discriminate on their face between men 
and women breach Article 26. It has done so in the fields of, inter alia, immigration 
regulations, unemployment benefits, widow pensions, and access to courts in relation 
to matrimonial property.127 However, the HRC has rejected other cases of facially 
discriminatory law. In Vos, for example, the HRC accepted facially discriminatory 
legislation on the basis that there was no discriminatory intent.128 In fact, the intent of 
the legislation was to streamline pensions and to afford subsistence level income to all 
persons who qualified. The law allowed Dutch men with a disability to retain the right 
to a disability allowance when their wives died; but on the death of their husbands 
disabled women were only eligible for a widow‘s pension, which in Ms. Vos‘ case 
was less than the disability pension. Charlesworth has criticised this decision for 
being based on ‗outmoded historical assumptions about the working habits of women 
and [for] privileg[ing] administrative convenience over the guarantees in Article 
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26.‘129 In fact the Vos judgement conflicts with other, earlier decisions of the Human 
Rights Committee that disregarded questions of intent, as well as its own General 
Comment, outlined above. Dissenting opinions in other decisions have made 
allowances for socio-economic developments to permit a margin of discretion to 
states in relation to discriminatory legislation.130 The latter contrasts with the view of 
the CESCR that while economic and social rights are to be ‗progressively realised,‘ 
equality guarantees are of immediate effect.131 
 
The CERD has similarly endorsed the view that ‗[a] distinction is contrary to the 
[ICERD] if it has either the purpose or effect of impairing particular rights and 
freedoms.‘132 The CERD derives its view from the language of Article 2(1)(c), which 
imposes an obligation on states parties to nullify any law or practice which has the 
effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination.133 The CERD also indicates 
that any differentiation of treatment is to be judged against ‗the objectives and 
purposes of the Convention.‘134 And that ‗[i]n seeking to determine whether an action 
has an effect contrary to the Convention, it will look to see whether that action has an 
unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or 
national or ethnic origin.‘135 (emphasis added) The position taken by CERD appears 
to be a more human rights- friendly approach than that adopted by the HRC and the 
CESCR in two main respects. First, it requires any justifications for differential 
treatment to be in line with the principles and purposes of the Convention, compared 
with the position taken by the HRC and the CESCR, which accept ‗reasonable and 
objective justifications‘ de- linked from the treaty scope. Second, the CERD suggests 
that the assessment standard should be ‗unjustified disparate impact upon a group.‘ It 
                                                 
129
 H. Charlesworth, ‗Concepts of Equality in International Law‘, in G. Huscroft & R. Rishworth (eds.), 
Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 
137, 141. Note that the dissenting opinion submitted by Urb ina and Wennergren rejected the analysis 
of the majority, claiming that some degree of flexib ility was required in the application of the t wo 
conflicting pension schemes so that an individual was not discriminated against on grounds of sex o r 
marital status. Other problematic cases include Ballantyne, Davidson and McIntyre v. Canada, HRC 
Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989 (a law that prohibited Canadian citizens from displaying commercial 
signs outside a business premises in English was held not to breach Article 26 on the grounds that ‗the 
prohibition [of using English] applies to French speakers as well as English speakers‘. The HRC did 
accept other breaches, such as that of Article 19).  
130
 Sprenger v. The Netherlands, HRC No. 395/90, per Messrs Ando, Herndl and N‘diaye, who argued 
that it was necessary to take into account ‗the reality that the socio -economic and cultural needs of 
society are constantly evolving …‘ in suggesting that discrimination in socio -economic rights may lag 
behind developments in other fields. See, also, Oulajin and Kaiss v. The Netherlands, HRC No. 
426/90, per Messrs Herndl, Müllerson, N‘diaye, and Sadi.  
131
 ICESCR, General Comment No. 16 (2004), Art icle 3: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the 
Enjoyment of A ll Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/3, para. 16.  
132
 CERD, General Recommendation XIV (1993), Defin ition of discrimination (Art. 1(1)), UN Doc. 
A/48/18, para. 2. 
133
 Art. 2(1)(c) provides: ‗States Parties condemn racial d iscrimination and undertake to pursue by all 
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and 
promoting understanding among all races, and, to this end: (c) Each State Party shall take effective 
measures to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws 
and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it 
exist.‘ 
134
 CERD, General Recommendation XIV (1993), Defin ition of discrimination (Art. 1(1)), UN Doc. 
A/48/18, para. 2. 
135
 CERD, General Recommendation XIV (1993), Defin ition of discrimination (Art. 1(1)), UN Doc. 
A/48/18, para. 2. 
 19 
thus considers racial discrimination within the context of collective disadvantage, 
rather than as individual aberrations.  
 
In the specific context of discrimination against non-citizens, in which some minor 
distinctions are permitted within the text of various treaties, 136 the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has stated that ‗differential treatment based on 
citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such 
differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, 
are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the 
achievement of this aim.‘137 It is not entirely clear if this is a different standard to that 
utilised in general.  
 
Like the HRC and the CESCR, the Women‘s Committee has endorsed a broad 
reading of discrimination. It has held that ‗discrimination against women is a 
multifaceted phenomenon that entails indirect and unintentional as well as direct and 
intentional discrimination.‘138 The Women‘s Committee has argued against 
maintaining a sole focus on formal or de jure equality, because doing so ‗tends to 
impede a proper understanding of the complex issue of discrimination, such as 
structural and indirect discrimination…‘139 Both qualitative and quantitative equality 
are considered to be at the heart of the CEDAW.140 In spite of these general 
statements, its case law has been mixed. In Nguyen, the Women‘s Committee rejected 
a case based on direct discrimination in relation to financial compensation for 
maternity leave that differed between salaried and self-employed women due to a 
restriction of a so-called ‗anti-accumulation‘ clause.141 The complainant was a part-
time salaried employee as well as a co-working spouse in her husband‘s business. 
Only the joint dissenting opinion stated that the so-called anti-accumulation clause 
may constitute a form of indirect discrimination: 
 
This view is based on the assumption that an employment situation, in which 
salaried part-time and self-employment is combined, as described by the 
complainant, is one which mainly women experience in the Netherlands, 
since, in general, it is mainly women who work part-time as salaried workers 
in addition to working as family helpers in their husbands‘ enterprises. 142 
 
Unlike the HRC and the CESCR (and most other international bodies), however, it 
has not accepted what is considered the ‗widely-used pragmatic‘ definition of 
discrimination, being seen as differential treatment in a comparable situation without 
a reasonable and objective justification.143 The Women‘s Committee has indicated 
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that ‗any objective and reasonable justification‘ be used only as a basis for the 
implementation of temporary special measures,144 not otherwise. 
 
(b) Discrimination versus inequality 
 
What then is discrimination? And, how does it relate to equality? The principles of 
non-discrimination and equality are often used interchangeably, but they are also 
accorded different, albeit subtly different, meanings. According to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, ‗… the concepts of equality and non-discrimination are 
reciprocal, like the two faces of one same institution. Equality is the positive face of 
non-discrimination. Discrimination is the negative face of equality.‘145 The UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated that they are 
‗integrally related and mutually reinforcing.‘146 Similarly, the Women‘s Committee 
has noted that the elimination of discrimination and the promotion of equality are 
‗two different but equally important goals in the quest for women‘s empowerment.‘147 
A recent study indicates that whether there is any real difference between the two 
terms as applied under international law is ‗inconclusive.‘148 It is generally accepted 
however that, at a minimum, non-discrimination is a negative right as it prohibits the 
making of distinctions between individuals, whereas equality is the goal centred 
around social justice, freedom, and dignity. Equality may also require additional 
measures (formal and substantive) to reach that goal. Non-discrimination can be 
conceived as a sub-set of equality or, alternatively, as a tool to guide us on the path to 
equality. However, the focus on discrimination has been criticised as being to the 
detriment of higher goals of equality (see below).  
 
(c) Public and private discrimination 
 
In 2000, the HRC issued a further General Comment on equality of rights between 
women and men.149 Building on their earlier statements, the General Comment 
provides that: ‗Articles 2 and 3 [of the ICCPR] mandate States parties to take all steps 
necessary, including the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex, to put an 
end to discriminatory actions both in the public and the private sector which impair 
the equal enjoyment of rights.‘150 According to the HRC, therefore, both public and 
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private inequality or discrimination are accepted as falling within the scope of the 
ICCPR. In clarifying its general position on public and private violations of human 
rights, the HRC stated:   
 
the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only 
be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against 
violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by 
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights 
in so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or 
entities. There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant 
rights as required by article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of 
those rights, as a result of States Parties' permitting or failing to take 
appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, 
investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or 
entities.151 
 
But at no time has direct horizontal effect been accepted. 152 As outlined above, the 
majority of the HRC‘s jurisprudence has involved forms of direct discrimination 
imposed and enforced by the state.  
 
Unlike the ICCPR, the CEDAW has the advantage of an express provision that covers 
discrimination in public and private spheres of life.153 As a core provision,154 the 
Women‘s Committee has asserted that any reservation to this provision is contrary to 
the object and purpose of the treaty and, therefore, incompatible with international 
law.155 Adopting the due diligence paradigm, the Women‘s Committee holds states 
parties responsible for ‗private acts‘ if they fail ‗to act with due diligence to prevent 
violations of rights, or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and to provide 
compensation.‘156 This paradigm has become the accepted standard for incorporating 
the acts of non-state actors in international law.157 In Goecke v. Austria, the Women‘s 
Committee held Austria liable for the failure on the part of the Austrian police to 
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respond to an emergency call, which led to the death by shooting of the complainant 
at the hands of her husband.158 It stated: 
 
[t]he Committee considers that given this combination of factors [which 
included increasing frequency of violent incidents by the husband over a 
three-year period], the police knew or should have known that Şahide Goekce 
was in serious danger; they should have treated the last call from her as an 
emergency, in particular because [her husband] had shown that he had the 
potential to be a very dangerous and violent criminal. The Committee 
considers that in light of the long record of earlier disturbances and battering, 
by not responding to the call immediately, the police are accountable for 
failing to exercise due diligence to protect Şahide Goekce. 159 
 
The Women‘s Committee further reiterated its earlier view that a perpetrator‘s right to 
liberty cannot supersede women‘s human rights to life and to physical and mental 
integrity.160 In spite of its explicit mandate over ‗private‘ actors in Article 2(e), the 
Women‘s Committee has not however extended it any further than the other treaty 
bodies. 
 
(d) Structural inequality 
 
The Women‘s Committee has examined structural causes of discrimination. It has 
made statements that discrimination is rooted in ‗traditional attitudes by which 
women are regarded as subordinate to men or as having stereotyped roles.‘161 The 
CEDAW contains a number of provisions that impose obligations upon states parties 
to address cultural and traditional practices that constitute discrimination against 
women. Article 2(f), for example, calls on states parties ‗[t]o take all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, 
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women.‘162 Article 5(a) 
provides that:  
 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the 
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are 
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or 
on stereotyped roles for men and women. 
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The inclusion of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in a single treaty 
places the CEDAW in a better position to tackle, in a holistic manner, structural 
aspects of violence against women. In spite of this, both the International Covenants 
have referred to tradition, history, religion, and culture as at the basis of inequality. 163  
 
The case law in this regard has presented some difficulties in applying these 
principles. In the case of Muñoz-Vargas y Sainz de Vicuña v. Spain, in which the 
complainant argued that as the first-born daughter of Enrique Muñoz-Vargas y 
Herreros de Tejada, who held the nobility title of ‗Count of Bulnes‘, she should 
succeed to that title.164 Instead Spanish law maintained that first-born daughters 
would only succeed if she had no younger brothers. Upon the death of her father, the 
complainant‘s younger brother succeeded to the title. She alleged that male primacy 
in the order of succession to titles of nobility constitutes a violation of the CEDAW. 
The application was declared inadmissible on two grounds, one of which is of 
relevance here.165 Eight members of the Women‘s Committee adopted a concurring 
opinion in which they stated that: 
 
It is undisputed in the present case that the title of nobility in question is of a 
purely symbolic and honorific nature, devoid of any legal or material effect. 
Consequently, we consider that claims of succession to such titles of nobility 
are not compatible with the provision of the Convention, which are aimed at 
protecting women from discrimination which has the effect or purpose of 
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of women on a 
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in all fields.166 
 
The same view was expressed by the Human Rights Committee in two similar 
cases.167 While recognising that titles of nobility are not generally compatible with 
ideals of equality, human rights, or democratic governance, a literal reading of the 
text of CEDAW nonetheless appears to trump general discontent with viewing titles 
of nobility as a human rights issue over the issue of inequality, especially equal 
access. In dissent, Mary Shanthi Dairiam invoked Article 5(a) of the CEDAW and re-
oriented the issue in the communication around ‗the negative effects of conduct [or 
laws] based on culture, custom, tradition and the ascription of stereotypical roles that 
entrench the inferiority of women.‘168 She notes that: 
 
... when Spanish law, enforced by Spanish courts, provides for exceptions to 
the constitutional guarantee for equality on the basis of history or the 
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perceived immaterial consequence of a differential treatment, it is a violation, 
in principle, of women‘s right to equality. Such exceptions serve to subvert 
social progress towards the elimination of discrimination against women using 
the very legal processes meant to bring about this progress, reinforce male 
superiority and maintain the status quo. This should neither be tolerated nor 
condoned on the basis of culture and history. Such attempts do not recognize 
the inalienable right to non-discrimination on the basis of sex which is a stand-
alone right. If this is not recognized in principle regardless of its material 
consequences, it serves to maintain an ideology and a norm entrenching the 
inferiority of women that could lead to the denial of other rights that are much 
more substantive and material. 169  
   
In other words, inequality should not be tolerated in any situation, and the very fact 
that inequality exists should characterise it as a human rights issue. Titles of nobility 
and other titular awards, however antithetical to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, must be granted on the basis of equality until they are fully dismantled, as 
they are part of the very fabric and foundations of society and their retention in 
unequal forms, reinforces a society built on inequality. Conceptualising inequality as 
social justice might have helped the majority of the Women‘s Committee arrive at a 
different result. 
 
(e) Multiple discrimination 
 
The inter-section of sex and other identity-based attributes or circumstances has been 
recognised by many of the treaty bodies. The committees have recognised the inter-
section of sex and other forms of discrimination on the grounds of colour, language, 
religion, political and other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other 
status, such as age, ethnicity, disability, marital, refugee or migrant. 170 Of all the 
treaty bodies, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has dealt 
with this issue most holistically. In 2000, the CERD issued a General 
Recommendation on the gender-related dimensions of racial discrimination, 
recognising that ‗racial discrimination does not always affect women and men equally 
or in the same way.‘171 Again, in 2000, the CERD issued a General Recommendation 
relating to discrimination against Roma, noting that Roma women are often victims of 
double discrimination.172 Its prior case law, however, indicates that CERD had yet to 
grasp the inter-section of race and sex. In Yilmaz-Dogan v. The Netherlands, the 
CERD did not address the question of discrimination based on gender stereotypes 
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when an employer sought to terminate the employment of a Turkish woman who was 
pregnant:  
 
[w]hen a Netherlands girl marries and has a baby, she stops working. Our 
foreign women workers, on the other hand, take the child to neighbours or 
family and at the slightest setback disappear on sick leave under the terms of 
the Sickness Act. They repeat that endlessly … [W]e cannot afford such 
goings-on.173 
 
Likewise, in a case involving the coerced sterilisation of a Hungarian woman of 
Roma ethnicity during an emergency operation to remove her dead foetus, the 
Women‘s Committee did not comment upon the impact the woman‘s ethnicity may 
have had on her treatment by the state. 174 This was in spite of well-documented 
reports at the time that discrimination against Roma was (and remains) one of the 
main human rights concerns in Hungary.175 It was also in spite of the state party 
raising irrelevant considerations in its defence such as her inability to pay for health 
care. Issues such as the language (Latin) and manner of explanation of the sterilisation 
procedure and on the consent form, the speed with which the decision to sterilise her 
was taken (within 17 minutes from admission to the termination of the surgery), and 
the assumptions made about her former knowledge about family planning, were taken 
for granted by the state party. In a supplementary submission, the complainant 
recalled ‗her extremely vulnerable situation when she sought medical attention … as a 
woman who would lose her child and as a member of a marginalized group of society 
– the Roma.‘176 No comment was made in relation to this by the state party, or the 
Committee in its final ‗views.‘  
 
4. Equality Law and the UN Treaty Bodies: Interim Findings 
 
International instruments and jurisprudence on equality have faced considerable 
scrutiny by feminist scholarship as outlined above. Many of these critiques are still 
applicable. The dominant paradigm of equality employed by the human rights treaty 
bodies remains centred around sameness and difference. The standard for 
achievement of equality is the male sex. Put another way, it calls for a female to male 
progression. The majority of the case law on equality has been brought by women, 
alleging facially unequal treatment compared with men in similar or the same 
situation (or at least a comparable situation).177 Occasionally men have brought 
complaints along the same lines. On the positive side of the ledger, discriminatory 
intent or purpose seems to have been set aside permanently as an irrelevancy, with 
focus instead on the effect of any measure, law, or action on women. However, the 
impact of such laws or actions has not always been fully comprehended, as shown in 
Vos.  
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Moreover, any distinctions between the treatment of men and women under the 
sameness/difference paradigm is to be justified according to criteria of 
‗reasonableness‘ and ‗objectivity.‘ Only the CEDAW has rejected this approach, 
while the CERD has offered a more nuanced version. In other words, what is 
prohibited is ‗arbitrary‘ discrimination, rather than discrimination per se. This was in 
fact the intention of the drafters of some of the instruments.178 The focus on 
discrimination, however, over-emphasises differences between men and women, and 
gives space for biological arguments to justify oppressive practices. It seems time for 
the committees to assert that there are limited biological differences between men and 
women that are relevant to justifying any difference in treatment, unless it is to correct 
inequality in the form of temporary special measures. These might be restricted to 
reproduction, childbirth, pregnancy, and pre- and post-natal issues. In fact, it is the 
comparative approach to equality that gives rise to this anomaly that the same factors 
are used to justify discriminatory treatment (e.g. arguments that assert that women are 
not capable of performing certain roles because of biology) as are used to justify 
exceptions to identical treatment (e.g. women need special care and assistance 
because of biological factors). On the contrary, gendered social and cultural patterns 
of the roles and responsibilities assigned to women and the economic and political 
inequalities between men and women justify introducing special measures in order to 
bring about equality writ large. This, to me, is at the heart of the sex/gender 
distinction.  
 
Overall, the terms remain contested and the case law is mixed. There is inconsistency 
within committees and between committees. While the committees tend to speak the 
rhetoric of multiple discrimination, they have proven largely unable to identify the 
range of identity-based factors at issue, or to assess their impact, in their case law. 
Distinctions still seem to be made between race and sex discrimination, reinforcing a 
hierarchical system that posits race above sex. The distinction between sex 
discrimination and inequality also remains unclear. Whether the terms are synonyms 
or qualitatively different is ‗inconclusive.‘179 Underlying social, political, and 
economic disparities within society structured around sex tend to be minimised in the 
framework of discrimination that prioritises individuals or individual issues, rather 
than equality which bears a broader ambit. Of course, it must be conceded to some 
degree that the nature of individual communications distorts this view in that 
direction.  
 
By and large, the treaty bodies have accepted few of the state party excuses for 
distinctions in law or practice between women and men, although there have been 
serious slippages with taking into account irrelevant considerations, such as 
administrative convenience. There has also been rhetorical acceptance of direct and 
indirect forms of discrimination, although the committees have not always addressed 
both aspects in individual cases. The committees have further tended to disregard 
structural causes of inequality in their case law, which can mean they are assessing 
the particular case in isolation of its social and cultural context. The practice of the 
Women‘s Committee to indicate general recommendations in addition to the 
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individual decision has however highlighted that inequality requires structurally-
based solutions; and the CERD has tended to perform better in its assessments of 
what constitutes discrimination by looking at the differential impact it will bear on the 
group as a whole. Overall, international human rights law continues to struggle in its 
handling of these fundamental concepts, although some progress has been made, even 
within the confines of the sameness/difference paradigm.  
 
The remainder of this article considers the approach of several of the treaty bodies to 
treat violence against women as a form of sex discrimination. Is it is a satisfactory 
approach to the omission of an explicit prohibition on violence against women (the 
gender gap) in international law? 
 
F. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS INEQUALITY AND SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
1. Violence against women as sex discrimination: the template 
 
In 1989, the Women‘s Committee issued a brief General Recommendation on 
violence against women, citing Articles 2, 5, 11, 12 and 16 as imposing obligations 
upon states to protect women against violence of any kind occurring within the 
family, at the workplace, or in any other area of social life.180 The Women‘s 
Committee elaborated upon its earlier position by adopting a more comprehensive 
Recommendation in 1992 in which it dealt with individual treaty provisions and the 
links between sex discrimination and violence against women. 181 The Committee was 
particularly concerned that, in spite of its 1989 General Recommendation, not all 
states party reports adequately reflected the close connection between discrimination 
against women, gender-based violence, and violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.182 Importantly, this General Recommendation declared that 
‗[g]ender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women‘s 
ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.‘ 183 Specifically 
the General Recommendation states that the definition of discrimination in Article 1 
of the CEDAW: 
 
includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a 
woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It 
includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats 
of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. 184 
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In particular, the Committee held that ‗[g]ender-based violence may breach specific 
provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions expressly 
mention violence.‘185 Clarifying its approach, the Committee states:  
 
Gender-based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or 
under human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of 
article 1 of the Convention.186   
 
In many ways, the development of this ‗template‘ transforms the CEDAW from a 
anti-discrimination treaty into a gender-based violence treaty. Not only is 
discrimination at the foundation of women‘s rights, the Women‘s Committee argues 
that so, too, is gender-related violence. The two issues are inseparable and both limit 
and restrict women‘s enjoyment of all other human rights.  
 
In its 1992 General Recommendation, the Women‘s Committee further makes the 
link between custom and tradition, and violence. The General Recommendation 
provides that: ‗[t]raditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to 
men or as having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices involving 
violence or coercion, such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry 
deaths, acid attacks and female circumcision.‘187 The Committee further stated that 
‗[s]uch prejudices and practices may justify gender-based violence as a form of 
protection or control of women‘ as well as contributing to the maintenance of women 
in subordinate roles, their low level of political participation, and low levels of 
education, skills and work opportunities.188 In other words, ‗[t]he effect of such 
violence on the physical and mental integrity of women is to deprive them of the 
equal enjoyment, exercise and knowledge of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.‘189 Moroever, the Committee asserted that ‗[t]hese attitudes also contribute 
to the propagation of pornography and the depiction and other commercial 
exploitation of women as sexual objects, rather than as individuals. This in turn 
contributes to gender-based violence.‘190 
 
In contrast to the CEDAW, the CERD contains an explicit prohibition against 
racially-motivated violence.191 As noted above, the CERD has recognised that certain 
forms of racial discrimination may be directed towards women specifically because of 
gender.  
 
                                                 
185
 CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), Violence against Women, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, para. 6. 
186
 CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), Violence against Women, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, para. 7. 
187
 CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), Violence against Women, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, para. 11. 
188
 CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), Violence against Women, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, para. 11. 
189
 CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), Violence against Women, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, para. 11. 
190
 CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), Violence against Women, UN Doc. 




Adopting a near identical approach as the Women‘s Committee, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated in 2004 that: 
 
[g]ender based violence is a form of discrimination that inhibits the ability to 
enjoy rights and freedoms, including economic, social and cultural rights, on a 
basis of equality. States parties must take appropriate measures to eliminate 
violence against men and women and act with due diligence to prevent, 
investigate, mediate, punish and redress acts of violence against them by 
private actors.192 
 
The approach of the Human Rights Committee has been similar, but less direct in its 
linkages between sex discrimination and violence against women. In 2000, the HRC 
stated that Article 3 of the ICCPR, which implies that all human beings should enjoy 
the rights provided for in the Covenant on an equal basis and in their totality, is 
impaired whenever any person is denied the full and equal enjoyment of any right.193 
From the catalogue of forms of violence outlined in the General Comment (see 
below), it is clear that the Human Rights Committee considers that violence against 
women impairs women‘s entitlement to enjoy ICCPR rights in equality and in totality. 
But it is not clear that the Committee considers violence against women to be a form 
of sex discrimination per se without additional considerations.  
 
So what has been the consequence of these types of approaches for women?  
 
 
2. All in?  
 
Utilising a sex discrimination framework, many forms of abuse and violence 
committed against women have been recognised as human rights‘ issues.  
 
(a) The Women‟s Committee 
 
Starting with the Women‘s Committee as the architects of the ‗template‘, it has 
addressed, in state party reports, inter alia, sexual violence, including gang rape and 
marital rape, domestic violence, physical violence, sexual harassment, and 
pornography.194 It has identified measures to eliminate violence against women, 
including criminalisation, awareness-raising and education, training of police, judicial 
and other personnel, national action plans, and assistance to victims in the form of 
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crisis centres, hotlines, legal, medical, psychological and emotional support, socio-
economic integration measures, and effective remedies. 195 The Committee has 
directly criticised traditional practices such as dowry, sati and devadasi systems,196 
and female genital mutilation.197 Education and public awareness campaigns have 
been seen as a key solution to eradicating such practices. 198  
 
Article 16 of the CEDAW, the family and marriage provision, has been utilised to 
address compulsory sterilisation or abortion199 and family violence.200 Article 5 has 
also been considered relevant here in relation to traditional and cultural stereotypes of 
gendered roles. In relation to the latter, the Committee has stated that: 
 
Family violence is one of the most insidious forms of violence against women.  
It is prevalent in all societies. Within family relationships women of all ages 
are subjected to violence of all kinds, including battering, rape, other forms of 
sexual assault, mental and other forms of violence, which are perpetuated by 
traditional attitudes. Lack of economic independence forces many women to 
stay in violent relationships. The abrogation of their family responsibilities by 
men can be a form of violence, and coercion. These forms of violence put 
women‘s health at risk and impair their ability to participate in family life and 
public life on a basis of equality.201 
 
In 1994, the Committee adopted a general recommendation on equality in marriage 
and family relations, which, although referring to a woman‘s right to legal autonomy 
in Article 15 of the CEDAW, does not link lack of autonomy, whether financial, 
emotional or legal, to risk of family violence.202 No specific mention is made of 
inequalities that exist in many jurisdictions in relation to the prosecution of marital 
rape or domestic violence, including laws or customs that exclude such violence as 
crimes or that provide defences to men that are not available to women. Further, the 
General Recommendation does not link the right to equal freedom of movement and 
choice of residence and domicile to the ability to escape domestic and other forms of 
violence; nor does it recognise that permitting such controlling behaviour by men 
over women, whether through law, custom or both, is often a precursor to violent 
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conduct. Rather, the General Recommendation simply inserts a paragraph referring 
readers back to its 1992 General Recommendation on violence against women.203 In 
the legal wording of Article 16(2), betrothals and marriage of children are deemed to 
have no legal effect. Forced marriage is specifically referred to in the 1994 General 
Recommendation as breaching ‗a woman's right to choose when, if, and whom she 
will marry‘ under Article 16(1)(a) and (b), although it is not characterized as a form 
of violence per se or as discrimination.204 As far as inheritance laws are concerned, 
the Women‘s Committee seeks to ensure equal laws relating to inheritance and as 
noted above, it has dealt with these issues in relation to harmful traditional practices. 
The Committee has elsewhere referred to the non-consensual genital examinations of 
women,205 unequal marriage practices between men and women, including low legal 
age of marriage, dowry practices, early and forced marriage, inheritance of women, 
and levirate206.207  
 
Sexual harassment in the workplace has also been identified as an issue of equality by 
the Women‘s Committee: ‗[e]quality in employment can be seriously impaired when 
women are subjected to gender-specific violence, such as sexual harassment in the 
workplace.‘208 Surprisingly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in its 2006 General Comment on the Right to Work did not refer to sex discrimination 
in the workforce in any form, whether as sexual harassment, exploitation, trafficking 
for forced labour, servitude, or debt bondage.209 Economic exploitation and forced 
labour are referred to in the context of children, but no particular mention is made of 
the particular situation of the girl-child.210 The CESCR has, however, made references 
to lack of legislation outlawing sexual harassment in its concluding observations on 
state party reports. 211 
 
In its jurisprudence, the Women‘s Committee has closely followed its 1992 General 
Recommendation. In its first admissible decision in A.T. v. Hungary, the Committee 
consistently pointed out the links between domestic violence and sex discrimination, 
recalling in several places its 1992 General Recommendation. In finding that the state 
party had failed in its due diligence responsibilities to protect A.T. from domestic 
violence and threats of such violence in breach of Article 2(a), (b) and (e) of the 
CEDAW, in particular the recognition by the state administrative apparatus of 
unrestrictive property rights of the husband to the family home, the Committee 
reiterated that ‗traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to 
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men contribute to violence against women,‘212 and that these attitudes plagued the 
state‘s dealings with her. Similar discussions have occurred in the above mentioned 
cases of Goekce and Yildrim.213 However, in the latter two cases none of the more 
general recommendations made to the state party targeted socio-economic inequality 
outside the specific context of domestic violence.214  
 
In the Women‘s Committee‘s fact- finding mission to Mexico, sex discrimination was 
seen as a contributing factor to the abduction, rape and murder of poor and young 
women, including adolescents, in Ciudad Juárez area of Chihuahua, Mexico, 
alongside social and cultural breakdown, lack of social services, poverty, class, and 
other social and economic factors. The disjuncture between evolving gender roles of 
women and traditional ‗patriarchal attitudes and mentalities‘ fostered an environment 
that was said to have developed ‗specific characteristics marked by hatred and 
misogyny. There have been widespread kidnappings, disappearances, rapes, 
mutilations and murders.‘ 215 The Committee stated: 
 
Along with combating crime, resolving the individual cases of murders and 
disappearances, finding and punishing those who are guilty, and providing 
support to the victims‘ families, the root causes of gender violence in its 
structural dimension and in all its forms — whether domestic and intra-
family violence or sexual violence and abuse, murders, kidnappings, and 
disappearances must be combated, specific policies on gender equality 
adopted and a gender perspective integrated into all public policies. 216  
 
In relation to the health consequences for women of violence, the Women‘s 
Committee has stated that ‗[v]iolence against women puts [women‘s] health and lives 
at risk.‘217 In this respect, the Committee refers to traditional practices perpetuated by 
culture and tradition that are harmful to the health of women and children. These 
practices include dietary restrictions for pregnant women, preference for male 
children, and female genital mutilation.218 A 1990 General Recommendation on 
‗female circumcision‘ squarely views such actions as a threat to health, 219 rather than 
a form of violence more specifically. The General Recommendation refers only to 
Articles 10 and 12 of the CEDAW, the former in relation to access to information 
about health and well-being and family planning, and the latter in relation to equal 
access to healthcare.220 Although equal access to health care facilities is referenced 
specifically in Article 12 of the CEDAW, the Committee further recommends that 
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states parties supply information on access to health care and/or safe abortion for 
victims of rape or coercion in fertility and reproduction.221 Similarly, in the 
Committee‘s 1990 General Recommendation on HIV/AIDS, there is mention of the 
risk of women to HIV/AIDS due to their subordinate position in many societies.222  
 
The inclusion of a specific provision on rural women in the CEDAW is heralded by 
feminist scholars as one of the unique and important additions that the CEDAW adds 
to pre-existing treaties.223 The Women‘s Committee has noted two specific issues 
relating to violence in respect of rural women, namely their risk of gender-based 
violence due to traditional attitudes and the ‗special risks of violence and sexual 
exploitation‘ faced by girls in the context of rural to urban migration for the purposes 
of migration.224 In the latter context, it is not clear why reference is only made to 
‗girls‘ rather than to ‗women‘ more generally, as certainly rural to urban migration is 
an issue for many women over the age of 18 years. The Women‘s Committee does 
not go as far as to recognise economic exploitation as a form of violence within rural 
communities. This is an issue of growing concern. For example, the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization reports that rural women are responsible for half the world‘s 
food production, and between 60 to 80 percent in developing countries. 225  
 
(b) The CESCR 
 
The CESCR has sought to incorporate violence against women within a number of its 
free-standing provisions, sometimes using the discrimination lens, sometimes 
considering it implicit. Many of the same issues of violence are referenced as being of 
international concern. For example, the CESCR has referred to ‗widow-cleansing‘, 
early marriages, and female genital mutilation. 226 Under Article 10 (right to family 
life), in conjunction with Article 3, the CESCR has dealt with issues of domestic 
violence, forced marriage, and gender-based violence generally.227 The Committee 
has also referred to domestic violence228 and the domestic servitude of children in 
other families who are subject to abuse, exploitation and trafficking, 229 without 
identifying the applicable treaty provision. The Committee has further raised concern 
regarding family laws that provide an obligation upon a wife to obey her husband,230 
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polygamy,231 unilateral divorce by husbands,232 more severe punishment for adultery 
imposed upon women,233 and ‗honour‘ crimes.234 
 
Under the health guarantee in Article 12 of the ICESCR, in combination with Article 
3, the CESCR has referred to female genital mutilation, as well as unequal access to 
water and sanitation resources that bear on a women‘s health. 235 In its General 
Comment on the Right to Health, the CESCR has stated that it includes control over 
one‘s body and sexual and reproductive freedom, 236 and that a wider definition takes 
into account violence and armed conflict.237 The CESCR further requires that a 
gender perspective be integrated into all policies and programs relating to health, 
including special attention to women‘s issues such as domestic violence, maternal 
mortality, and harmful traditional practices that deny full reproductive rights.238  
Reiterating the scope of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the CESCR also 
refers to the need for states to adopt effective and appropriate measures to abolish 
harmful traditional practices affecting the health of children, particularly girls, 
including early marriage, female genital mutilation, and preferential feeding and care 
of male children.239  
 
In the context of Articles 11 (right to an adequate standard of living) and 3, the 
CESCR has further called on States to eradicate traditional practices that allow men to 
eat prior to women, or in which women are given the least nutritious food. 240 In its 
General Comment on the right to adequate housing, however, the CESCR overlooked 
victims of domestic violence or trafficking as a group in need of accessible and safe 
housing, although it mentioned a whole range of other ‗disadvantaged groups‘ such as 
victims of natural disasters, the elderly, and the physically disabled. 241  
 
In a General Comment on forced evictions, the CESCR gives specific recognition is 
given to women, alongside ‗children, youth, older persons, indigenous people, ethnic 
and other minorities, and other vulnerable individuals and groups‘, who are 
considered to ‗all suffer disproportionately‘ from the practice of forced evictions.242 
Women are considered ‗especially vulnerable‘ given the extent of statutory and other 
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forms of discrimination which often apply in relation to property rights (including 
home ownership) or rights of access to property or accommodation and their 
particular vulnerability to acts of violence and sexual abuse when they are rendered 
homeless.243 The CESCR holds that the non-discrimination provisions of Articles 2(2) 
and 3 of the Covenant impose an additional obligation upon governments to ensure 
that, where evictions do occur, appropriate measures are taken to ensure that no forms 
of discrimination are involved.244  
 
(c) The HRC 
 
In comparison to the Women‘s Committee and the CESCR, most of the 
communications brought under Article 26 of the ICCPR before the Human Rights 
Committee have not related to violence against women. This may be because the 
ICCPR contains a number of other possible rights within which violence may be 
prescribed. For example, violence against women tends to be framed by the HRC 
within the context of other rights, such as the right to life or the prohibition against 
torture.245 In its concluding observations on state party reports, the HRC has 
mentioned, inter alia, wife inheritance,246 forced marriage,247 female genital 
mutilation,248 pledging of girls for economic gain,249 detention of women rejected by 
their families,250 domestic violence,251 lack of rape prosecutions252 or exemption from 
prosecution if marriage follows rape,253 sexual exploitation of foreign women,254 and 
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trafficking in women.255 Some of these references take account of discriminatory 
factors, but others do not.  
 
The HRC identifies that many issues fall within its Covenant and which may affect 
women‘s enjoyment of a myriad of other rights not limited to rights to equality, 
including the vulnerability of women to rape, abduction and other forms of gender-
based violence within international and internal armed conflict, 256 high infant and 
maternal mortality rates, female infanticide, dowry killings, widow burning, risk of 
death from clandestine abortion (all considered under Article 6),257 domestic and 
other violence against women, including rape, forced abortion, forced sterilization, 
and genital mutilation (Article 7),258 trafficking in women and forced prostitution, 
slavery disguised as domestic or other service (Article 8), 259 refusal to wear the veil or 
other clothing requirements that carry penalties of corporal punishment, restrictions 
on freedom of movement, or detention (Articles 7, 9 and 12), 260 humane treatment in 
detention including separation between men and women and female guards,261 
prosecutions for rape in marriage, and access to abortion, sterilisation or pregnancy 
without consent from husbands or not reliant upon it (Article 17). 262 By and large, the 
HRC has tied these forms of violence to a particular human right, rarely being Article 
26. The HRC has further noted that inequality, based in tradition, history, religion, or 
culture, contributes to particular abuses against women, listing in particular pre-natal 
sex selection and abortion of female fetuses.263 
 
(d) The CERD 
 
As noted above, the CERD has issued a General Recommendation on the gender-
related dimensions of racial discrimination, in which it takes account of various forms 
of violence suffered by women. The CERD refers to sexual violence against women 
members of particular racial or ethnic groups, coerced sterilization of indigenous 
women, and abuse of women workers in the informal or domestic sectors. The CERD 
has also recognised that the consequences of such violence may impact upon women 
differently, such as pregnancy resulting from racially-motivated rape, in which some 
women may be ostracised by their communities. Women may not have the same 
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access to remedies or complaints mechanisms for racial discrimination because of 
gender-related impediments, such as gender bias in the legal system and 
discrimination against women in the private spheres of life. 264 But the real difficulty 
for the ICERD is that any sexual violence must have an element of racial 
discrimination, which is difficult to sustain in the context of intra-racial violence or 
family violence where members belong to the same racial or ethnic group.  
 
 
It is now generally accepted by at least the four treaty bodies studied in this article 
that violence against women is either a form of sex discrimination, or alternat ively, 
that conditions of inequality in society foster and perpetuate violence against women. 
Either way, there has been a plethora of statements attesting to the inter- linkages 
between sex discrimination and violence. But how effective is this approach in filling 
this gender gap (that is, the absence of an explicit prohibition on violence against 
women) in international law?  
 
3. Filling the gender gap? 
 
Undoubtedly treating violence against women as sex discrimination fills an important 
gap in international human rights law. However, it also carries its own set of problems 
for women and their status within the system.  
 
The first, and most obvious, advantage of the template formulated by the Women‘s 
Committee, and followed to a greater or lesser extent by most of the other treaty 
bodies, is that had it not been developed, the UN treaty bodies would not have 
otherwise been able to deal with violence against women in such a broad way. In 
much the same way as MacKinnon‘s work on sexual harassment as sex discrimination 
in the US, the Women‘s Committee‘s approach is a pragmatic response to a gap in the 
law.265 The Women‘s Committee, in particular, would have been limited to the scope 
of the treaty and restricted to dealing with violence against women within specific 
contexts, such as trafficking in Article 6 of the CEDAW. Likewise, the HRC would 
only have had the option of dealing with it as a violation of other provisions such as 
those on torture, slavery, security of person, or life. 266  
 
Practically speaking, an equality paradigm would not permit exceptions or 
distinctions in criminal laws for particular forms of gender-related violence, or its 
selective prosecution.267 Joan Fitzpatrick argues, for example, that domestic violence 
in particular results from the failure of the legal system to treat such violence in the 
same manner and to the same degree as violence by strangers. Thus, women are 
denied the equal protection of criminal law, in contravention of the principle of 
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equality before the law.268 Similarly, rape inside and outside of marriage would be 
treated in an like way as a criminal offence. It would also bar selective failures ‗to 
prosecute rapists of prostitutes or members of vulnerable groups, such as disabled 
women.‘269  Anthony Ewing suggests that an equality paradigm could prove useful 
when a state investigates murder cases against men, but fails to do the same in respect 
of ‗honour‘ killings against women.270 Additionally, defences available to men that 
are not available to women, such as formal or customary rules  that permit men to 
invoke unilateral divorce, or where the state maintains Hudood Ordinances that are 
not applied equally would be unlawful.271 However, the equality paradigm, if taken as 
treating like alike, can also be used with the opposite result (see below). 
 
Second, the sex discrimination template contextualises violence as a social justice 
issue, rather than treating it as an individual anomaly. It approves the understanding 
of violence against women in a wider socio-political context, characterised variously 
by patriarchy, traditional and cultural stereotypes of women, rigid gender roles, 
poverty, and lack of economic and political autonomy for women. Violence against 
women seen in this way is a symptom of a much wider social problem. Julie 
Goldscheid writes that ‗the daily experience of domestic and sexual violence 
survivors reflects the ongoing legacy of sex discrimination, both in the persistent 
gender-based differences in who generally commits and is harmed by the abuse, and 
in the responses victims encounter from legal, criminal justice, and social service 
systems.‘272 In other words, it is an accurate portrayal of the reality of women‘s lives. 
Treating violence against women as rooted in unequal relations between women and 
men allows the committees to delve deeper into the causes of it. The sex 
discrimination template may in fact respond to some of the feminist critiques of 
international human rights law that it fails to respond to women‘s particularised 
experiences, it oversimplifies complex power relations, or that it does not allow 
transformative outcomes.  
 
A third value in constructing violence against women as sex discrimination is that it 
turns what may otherwise be characterised as a private indiscretion or criminal 
activity into political violence. Inequality as a social phenomenon, rather than an 
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individual experience (although it is played out against individual women), requires 
social and political responses. It deconstructs the public/private dichotomy in so far as 
so-called ‗private‘ violence is turned into a public issue because it is set against the 
structural or public context of sexual inequality.  
 
The sex discrimination template can also be utilised in favour of men who experience 
gender-related violence because they do not adhere to accepted social and cultural 
mores. 
 
Definitions under international law of ‗violence,‘ or ‗violence against women‘ favour 
physical, psychological and sexual abuse.273 They rarely extend as far as to include 
economic exploitation, militarisation, globalisation, or structural violence.274 Broad 
understandings of inequality, on the other hand, can include a number of forms of 
harm that do not fit the narrow definition of violence, and may extend to include other 
acts that may not generally be conceived as ‗violence‘, such as pornography, or 
practices that foster and reinforce subordination and violence but which are not 
always characterised in this way, such as polygamy.  
 
The sex discrimination template is not, however, the panacea to the missing 
prohibition on violence against women. First, attaching violence against women to the 
concepts of sex discrimination and inequality is subject to understandings of these 
latter terms, which, as shown above, are complex, contested, and difficult to pin 
down. Moreover, the exact content and meaning of these terms is far from agreed 
among the treaty bodies, and their implementation record varies. The prohibition on 
discrimination is, although a non-derogable right, a limited one. Apart from the 
Women‘s Committee, all the treaty bodies‘ approaches to discrimination give room to 
justify discriminatory practices on the basis of ‗reasonable and objective‘ criteria. 
These two criteria have been strongly criticised by feminist scholars in other contexts 
as being gender-neutral and, therefore, likely to exclude or disregard the particular 
circumstances facing women. The concern would be that these same excuses would 
be available to be argued and applied to failures to protect women from violence, to 
prosecute or punish alleged offenders, or to provide appropriate redress.  
 
What follows from the difficulty to pin down the concepts of equality and non-
discrimination on the basis of sex is that this gives rise to implementation difficulties. 
Julie Goldscheid notes that the connection between sex discrimination and sexual and 
domestic violence is ‗not easily, nor precisely, described.‘275 The experience of the 
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International Criminal Tribunals shows that recognising rape, for example, as sex 
discrimination (in this case that it constituted a crime against humanity) can be 
problematic. In Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, the defendants admitted rape, but 
argued that the rape in question was an indiscretion or personal, rather than 
political.276 Similarly, under international refugee law, arguments are often made by 
governments and judiciaries that acts of gender-based violence do not amount to 
political persecution as they are simply personal. In the United Kingdom House of 
Lords‘ asylum decision of Shah and Islam, Lord Hoffman acknowledged that there 
was a threat of violence to the claimants from their husbands, but he stated: ‗This is a 
personal affair, directed against them as individuals.‘277 Only in recognising the 
inability or unwillingness of the state to do anything to protect them because they 
were women did state responsibility become invoked. Lord Hoffman stated that it was 
‗[t]he combination of these two elements‘ that made the otherwise private violence 
fall within the meaning of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as 
amended by its 1967 Protocol.278 The violence or threat of violence itself was 
insufficient, even though it was perpetuated by a social and legal context that 
endorsed differential treatment between women and men.  
 
Second, the CEDAW template deals only with gender-related forms of violence, or 
violence that is based upon or linked to discrimination. It does not, for instance, cover 
violence perpetrated against women outside this context, such as the torture of women 
by physical violence in state custody. Such violence remains to be dealt with under 
other provisions. Requiring a link to be established between violence and sex 
discrimination in order to recognise that violence as an issue of human rights law 
narrows the scope of human rights law considerably. Gender alone may not be a 
significant or relevant factor in each act of domestic or sexual violence, for example. 
That is, describing such violence as ‗gender violence‘ may be ‗underinclusive because 
individual acts may be informed by other socio-political factors as well as gender.‘279 
It also speaks to some feminist scholars who have resisted the priority or 
exclusiveness of gender over other identity-based factors.  
 
Ultimately this approach still results in men and women being treated unequally. 
Violence that disproportionately affects men, for example, is not burdened with an 
additional link to sex discrimination, or any other additional factors. Under 
international human rights law, torture is torture. Women victims of violence, 
whatever its form or manifestation, are only protected by human rights law if she can 
establish that the violence is discriminatory, or otherwise fits another provision. While 
it has been widely argued in feminist academic circles that rape of women, for 
example, is always discriminatory (that is, women are at risk of rape due to gendered 
assumptions and stereotypes concerning the value and worth of women and due to 
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women‘s oppression in society at large),280 this is far more difficult to prove through 
empirical evidence in individual cases. Doing so further splits violence against 
women into two categories – those acts motivated by gender and those that are not; 
those that are worthy of international human rights protection, those that are not. This 
in turn undermines the feminist message of women‘s subordination; as well as the  
alternative view that women are autonomous human beings.  
 
Finally, it has been claimed that the rhetoric of an inequality paradigm can be a 
powerful one. However, in domestic jurisdictions where it has been applied, 
commentators have emphasised that many if not most of the reforms or responses to 
sexual and domestic violence target neither sex discrimination nor other socio-
political factors.281 Moreover, the rhetoric of inequality may in fact be weaker than 




Settling the meaning and content of the fundamental principles of equality and non-
discrimination on the basis of sex remains one of the greatest challenges for 
international human rights law. In fact, the ‗defining development of our time‘ has 
struggled under the weight of uncertain and varying definitions, interpretations, and 
applications. This article has shown that the debate has not changed significantly in 
the last twenty years, except to the extent that ideas of formal and substantive equality 
are now generally accepted components of equality law. But these advances are still 
held to ransom by the usage of gender-charged criteria of exception, such as 
reasonableness and objectivity. The first half of this article pointed to a system that 
continues to struggle with interpreting and applying these concepts, in particular 
because they remain tied to the sameness/difference ideology. This in turn causes 
difficulties in applying them to the issue of violence against women. At least three 
feminist scholars have called for a re-conceptualisation of equality.  
 
Drawing on the work of the Canadian Supreme Court, Kathleen Maloney has 
recommended a new vision of equality in terms of ‗socially created advantage and 
disadvantage‘ instead of sameness and difference.282 She claims that the 
sameness/difference model does not permit any examination of how the legal system 
maintains and constructs the disadvantage of women, or how the law is ‗male-defined 
and built on male conceptions of problems and of harms.‘283  Under the Aristotelian 
model, systemic and persistent disadvantage is not contemplated.  
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In a similar re-think, Iris Marion Young has proposed an analysis of inequality in 
terms of oppression and domination. She notes that: 
 
[w]hile discriminatory policies sometimes cause or reinforce oppression, 
oppression involves many actions, practices, and structures that have little to 
do with preferring or excluding members of groups in the awarding of 
benefits.284 
 
Under this analysis, special measures would not be framed as an exception to the 
principle of non-discrimination, but rather as one strategy to deal with structures of 
oppression and domination.285 Supporting the view of Young, Charlesworth has 
suggested less emphasis be given to non-discrimination. Instead, she recommends that 
a broader idea of equality ought to be developed. She has argued that the elision 
between the two concepts has constrained their ability to deal with women‘s 
realities.286  
 
The third feminist scholar I wish to mention who has recommended a re-orientation of 
the concept of equality is Catharine MacKinnon. Because women are below men in 
social, economic and political indicators, she argues that the movement for equality 
should not be oriented to being the same as men, but on ‗ending violation and abuse 
and second-class citizenship‘ of women because of their sex. 287 The concept that has 
emerged in this re-orientation, which she suggests has already emerged in many 
different jurisdictions, is:  
 
equality as lack of hierarchy, rather than sameness or difference, in a relative 
universality that embraces rather than eliminates or levels particularity. A 
refusal to settle for anything less than a single standard of human dignity and 
entitlement combines here with a demand that the single standards themselves 
are equalized. All this leaves Aristotle in the dust. … Its principles include: if 
men do not do it to each other, they cannot do it to us … 288 
 
MacKinnon, too, praises the approach of Canada‘s Supreme Court. But would these 
new frameworks make any real difference for women victims of violence seeking to 
utilise the UN human rights treaty system?  
 
All three proposals are strides ahead of the current general approaches of the treaty 
bodies to discrimination and inequality. It is possible though to see glimpses of these 
alternative approaches to equality within the statements of some of the committees, 
which may hint of new directions yet to come. The CESCR has, for instance, used the 
language of ‗inherent disadvantage‘, while the CERD has applied ideas of 
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‗unjustifiable disparate impact.‘ Nonetheless, none of the re-conceptualisations appear 
to overcome the difficulties of applying them in practice in the context of violence 
against women. Ideas of disadvantage and oppression/domination are still complex 
concepts; they still add an additional element of proof for individual complainants, 
one that is not applied in other contexts; not all forms of violence against women can 
be linked to such disadvantage or oppression/domination; and they relegate women to 
positions of disadvantage in perpetuity. Furthermore, the discrimination-violence link, 
however discrimination is re-cast, does not get away from the fact that there is a 
separation between the act (the violence) and the cause (discrimination or 
disadvantage). In no other area of human rights law is the cause of the violence built 
into the prohibition. It seems that whatever definition of discrimination and equality is 
applied, the remedy for violence suffered by women is ‗exceptionalised.‘ In this way, 
it masks the fact that egregious harm is being done on a widespread basis to half the 
world‘s population, wherever they happen to live. This in turn perpetuates a system of 
law and politics that excludes, marginalises, and silences women.  
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